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of the localised actions of logistical disruption that 
have multiplied around the world in recent years; 
their degree of success, indeed, is to be measured 
first and foremost against the particular demands 
of the workers and activists undertaking them. 
Rather, what is perhaps worth questioning here 
is the conceptual schema that seems to emerge, 
more or less explicitly, from a number of attempts 
at theorising such actions: whereby logistics = flow 
= capitalism, therefore blockade = interruption = 
resistance.4 Here it should suffice to mention the 
example of the Occupied Palestinian Territories, 
and of the blockaded Gaza Strip, in particular, to 
start disrupting such a schema. To anyone familiar 
with the situation in Palestine, the recent entry into 
circulation of terms like ‘occupy’ or ‘blockade’ as key 
slogans of a self-proclaimed global movement of 
emancipation may have sounded, to say the least, 
odd. What it raises is not merely a branding problem, 
but rather a conceptual one. Unless key sites of 
struggle over mobility and circulation, such as 
Palestine, are carved out as exceptions to an other-
wise global rule of logistical capitalism, practices of 
obstruction and interruption cannot immediately be 
held as effective tactics of counter-power.
The main limit of the current critique of logistics 
that this essay sets out to discuss can be articulated 
as follows: due to an excessive theoretical focus on 
its instrumental role within globalised capitalism, 
logistics tends to be only considered in terms of 
the flows that it releases and speeds up; in turn, 
this tendency entails a conceptual decoupling of 
Introduction
What are the blind spots of a view of logistics as 
‘capital’s art of war’?1 This lapidary definition can 
be said to encapsulate the primary angle of critique 
used in much of the recent, humanities-based 
scholarship on logistics.2 Undeniably, logistics plays 
a pivotal role in the current model of capitalism; 
as such, its operational logic increasingly sets the 
rules for the restructuring of spaces and conditions 
of labour all along a world-encompassing supply 
chain. Yet this fact alone does not immediately entail 
that the field of operations of logistics can be strictly 
reduced to capitalist dynamics. Could it be that, in 
order to formulate an effective critique of logistics, 
one needs to venture beyond the horizon of capital?
Paradoxically, it is the relative success of a major 
political mobilisation around and against logis-
tics that prompts us to pose this question. On 2 
November 2011, about twenty thousand protesters 
marched into the port of Oakland – the fifth busiest 
container port in the US – causing a total shut-
down of its activity. Widely discussed in the critical 
literature on logistics, the blockade of the Port of 
Oakland is often described as the most signifi-
cant instance of the Occupy movement, because 
of the actual disruption it caused to the material 
flows of transnational capitalism. Among circles of 
the radical left, it has led to a discourse praising 
‘a move from the strike to the blockade’ as a new 
paradigm of anti-capitalist action in the globalised 
condition.3 It would, of course, be foolish to pretend 
assessing, in general terms, the strategic character 
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paradigm of logistics. The conclusion returns to 
the notion of logistical power used throughout the 
essay, from the perspective of the expanded critical 
frame that it has outlined in the previous sections. 
[Fig. 1a, 1b]
War as the continuation of logistics by other 
means
In 2005, Israel launched a unilateral Disengagement 
Plan, which resulted in the withdrawal of the military 
positions and the dismantlement of the settlements it 
had established inside the Gaza Strip since 1967. It 
is no longer necessary to argue that this disengage-
ment did not end the occupation of Gaza, but rather 
inaugurated an occupation of a new kind. In parallel 
to the disengagement process, the concomitant 
establishment, in 2007, of a drastic international 
blockade has turned Gaza into an experimental 
laboratory of colonial governance, where ‘Israel 
fine-tunes a dubious balance of maximum control 
and minimum responsibility’.6 Rather than marking 
the boundaries of Israel’s territorial sovereignty, the 
blockade thus forms the primary infrastructure of 
the regime of power currently deployed over Gaza.
The sea, land, and air blockade of the Gaza 
Strip has now entered into its second decade. By 
reducing the inflow of life-sustaining resources to 
a bare minimum for the survival of its two million 
captive residents, it created a structure of subjuga-
tion that is unparalleled around the world.7 Unlike a 
medieval siege, the purpose of the blockade is not 
to completely cut off the supply lines of the warring 
citadel of Gaza up to its final capitulation. Almost 
every day, some goods, some supplies, and to a 
lesser extent, some people do cross the border 
of Gaza in either direction. Such flows ensure the 
survival of an ever-growing population living on a 
narrow strip of land that has been rendered practi-
cally unfit for any form of productive economy. For 
this reason, the blockade could, at least in principle, 
last indefinitely.
logistics from questions of restricted mobility, isola-
tion, or confinement. As a result, the current critique 
of logistics can be said to ignore a vast and signifi-
cant domain of logistical operations. What would it 
mean to understand logistics as operating as much 
on the fostering of certain flows as on the hindering 
of others?
With a view to addressing this question, the 
essay turns to the blockaded Gaza Strip. While it 
is rightly perceived as a place of closure – one that 
is essentially bypassed by the flows of goods that 
logistics is meant to orchestrate – Gaza is nonethe-
less proposed here as a paradigmatic logistical site; 
in the process, the essay outlines a reconstruction 
of the problem of logistics as seen through the prism 
of Gaza. At its core is a call to approach processes 
of enclosure, isolation, and restriction of mobility as 
logistical operations — in fact, as a mirror image of 
the fast-tracking operations that logistics is primarily 
known for.
To develop this argument, the architectural 
perspective becomes critical. Indeed, an examina-
tion of the Gaza blockade as a material process 
reveals that the spatial and technical infrastructure 
used to obstruct circulations into and out of Gaza 
shares much in common with the one tasked with 
lubricating the flow of goods and labour around the 
globe. The essay proceeds by setting Gaza’s archi-
tecture of confinement against the ‘architecture 
of flow’ that typically characterises logistical sites 
around the world.5 The material connections that 
are identified in the process form the basis upon 
which the proposed revision to the problem of logis-
tics is articulated. The essay is thus structured as 
follows. A first section examines the particular rela-
tion between war and logistics that emerges from 
Gaza’s recent past. A second section addresses 
the reversibility of the logistical apparatus through 
a reading of Gaza as a zone in reverse. A third and 
final section turns to Gaza’s border crossings with a 
view to discussing the terminal as the architectural 
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communication across the border, those tunnels 
posed indeed a fundamental – one may say topo-
logical – threat to the exercise of a mode of power 
based on the control of all forms of circulation. The 
army was thus called on to remodel a contested 
terrain – to fill in the dangerous cavities through 
which Gaza was quite literally undercutting Israel’s 
authority.
The army’s role in shaping the spatial condi-
tions by which Gaza is governed can be identified 
in many other instances and extends beyond the 
timeframes of its mobilisation for large-scale mili-
tary operations. Another example is the permanent 
‘buffer zone’ that runs along the internal perimeter of 
Gaza, and which considerably increases the fence’s 
encroachment into Palestinian territory. Its thickness 
is variable – from a hundred metres up to three kilo-
metres during military operations.11 Regardless of 
the lines on a map, the territory where the people 
of Gaza can venture effectively ends where the 
army’s bullets land; and it is through the regular 
shooting of anyone crossing that invisible line that 
the soldiers permanently posted along the fence 
remind the residents of Gaza of the current extent of 
the buffer-zone – or inform them of its new width.12 
This process has its exact counterpart on the mari-
time border of Gaza, where the limit of the permitted 
fishing area ebbs and flows according to how close 
to the coast the Israeli navy’s ships are effectively 
patrolling.13 Gaza’s variable geography must thus 
be understood as actively enforced and violently 
modelled by the Israeli army, so as to constantly 
adjust the degree of tightening of the blockade. 
As a peak of intensity in this enduring economy of 
violence, war is employed as a radical instrument in 
the continuous process of conformation of Gaza’s 
territory to the mode of power it is subjected to.
Manifesting a thorough blurring of the distinction 
between the military and civilian domains, the Israeli 
army is increasingly mobilised to build durable 
infrastructural projects, designed to upgrade the 
The approval or denial of any crossings of the 
Gaza border is the remit of COGAT (Coordination 
of Government Activities in the Territories), a unit 
subordinate to Israel’s Minister of Defence and 
commanded by a Major General of the IDF. Every 
day, via its official Twitter account, COGAT posts 
detailed statistics about the number of trucks it 
allowed into Gaza, the total quantity of goods they 
transported in tons, or the number of ambulance 
crossings it allowed.8 As an inexpensive public rela-
tions campaign, these daily tweets perform two 
distinct tasks. The obvious one is to downplay any 
allegations that Israel is strangling Gaza, by mini-
mising, in the eyes of the general public, the degree 
of restriction to the flow of goods and people imposed 
by the blockade. The other one reveals, and in fact 
affirms, the real purpose of the blockade as a regime 
of power. Rather than simply obstructing passage, 
the closure of the Gaza border enables, above all, 
a form of centralised and meticulous oversight over 
distributed circulations – rendered by the detailed 
figures that COGAT is so keen to tweet. With the 
establishment of the blockade, the Israeli authori-
ties have gained the ability to channel, monitor, and 
modulate the flow of everything going into and out 
of the Palestinian enclave. Parallel to the indefinite 
suspension of customary political, juridical, and 
diplomatic processes, logistics has thus turned into 
the main mechanism by which Gaza is effectively 
governed.
Since 2008, Gaza has endured three wars – which 
caused thousands of civilian casualties together 
with the recurrent, extensive destruction of its built 
environment.9 Not only has the blockade constituted 
the structural trigger of each of these wars, but also, 
arguably, their primary stake. The case of the latest 
war makes this point particularly clear. Aptly code-
named ‘Protective Edge’, the 2014 Israeli military 
operation in Gaza had as its declared objective the 
destruction of the network of tunnels which had 
been dug in the subsoil of Gaza in response to the 
blockade.10 By opening up channels of unmonitored 
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survive without starving; based on the average 
figure of 2,279 calories per person, it inferred the 
maximum number of food trucks to be allowed into 
the enclave every day. In practice, over the past 
decade, this logistical obstruction has been regu-
larly falling far below its own red lines.17
The same policy applies to other basic needs 
of the Gaza population – from electricity to fuel, 
water, or cement. Over time, the technical appa-
ratus employed to channel the circulation of such 
indispensable supplies appears to be undergoing 
significant upgrades. Established in the aftermath of 
the 2014 war, the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism 
(GRM) is a data-driven logistical framework regu-
lating the inflow of construction materials into the 
enclave.18 For every single building project, an 
application must be submitted electronically that 
includes the details of the applicant, the exact loca-
tion of the building, the purpose of the construction, 
and the amount of materials requested. Assembled 
and maintained by the UN with a distant involve-
ment of the Palestinian Authority, the GRM database 
is then regularly reviewed by the Israeli authorities 
who approve or reject projects, thereby determining 
which packets of materials will be allowed into the 
enclave and which ones will be refused. As such, 
the GRM doesn’t only support the continuation of 
the broad logistical rule imposed on the population 
of Gaza; it also marks a significant increase of the 
resolution at which it can operate.
Manifested, most commonly, by the ‘just-in-time’ 
principle commanding the global supply chains of 
today, the rule of logistics also seems to produce 
its own temporality: that of a never-ending present. 
When the only objective of power is to prevent an 
impending catastrophe, its response is to postpone 
it indefinitely, without ever overcoming it; in the 
meantime, dwelling on the verge of a catastrophe 
guarantees permanent access to an array of emer-
gency measures.19 The offensive mode of warfare 
of yesterday used logistics in order to prepare for 
security architecture of the Gaza blockade. Since 
the summer of 2017, it has been constructing a 
sixty-kilometre long underground barrier that runs 
all along the Gaza fence – the depth and detec-
tion features of which remain unspecified – with 
the objective of getting rid, once and for all, of the 
problem of the Gaza tunnels.14 After it was deployed 
on the terrestrial, aerial, and maritime domain, 
the blockade’s reach into the subsoil appears to 
complete Israel’s project to hermetically seal off 
the Gaza Strip – except for the few gateways that 
remain under its total control.
Emptied out of any semblance of rule of law, the 
blockaded Gaza strip was opened up to the rule of 
logistics. Far from constituting a simplification of the 
legal structure of power, this process has rather led 
to a reconfiguration of its operational logic. The very 
etymology of our modern notion of logistics seems 
to echo this shift. While the term is commonly traced 
back to the Greek root logos, a number of linguists 
have stressed the etymological detour of the term 
through the Middle French logis, ‘shelter for an 
army, encampment’, itself from the Proto-Germanic 
laubja – ‘shelter’.15 It could be said that it is outside 
the polis, and along military campaigns, that logis-
tics has departed from the logos of the law. With 
this shift, the main problem of power is no longer to 
legislate, but to lodge; no longer to posit a frame, 
but to structure a motion. Whether the moving 
parts of such overall motion shall be hastened or 
restrained depends on the objectives of any given 
logistical deployment.
From the outset, the blockade of Gaza has been 
designed as a tool of ‘economic warfare’.16 The 
severe reduction of all available resources was 
conceived by the Israeli authorities as a means 
to put pressure on the population of the Strip and 
lead to their ousting of Hamas. As revealed by the 
now infamous ‘red lines’ document, COGAT went 
as far as calculating the minimum number of daily 
calories required for every Palestinian in Gaza to 
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During the 1970s and 80s, the residents of Gaza 
were generally granted permission to leave the 
Strip, primarily to be employed as a cheap labour 
force in Israel and its settlements. Following Israel’s 
revocation of all Gaza workers’ permits in 1991, the 
first Israel-Gaza security barrier was built in 1994. 
The process of gradual tightening of the border, 
through both economic and architectural measures, 
led to the establishment of the blockade in 2007.20 
With it, the degree of permeability of the Gaza 
border has reached new lows; yet, as discussed 
above, it is never completely closed: rather, the 
general condition of obstruction makes every cross-
border circulation a matter of vital importance, while 
providing vast leverage to the authorities that decide 
over what may enter or exit Gaza. The blockade 
does not undermine logistics; rather, the blockade 
is itself a vast logistical operation.
As a fenced-off territorial formation character-
ised by the special regime of circulation applying 
to everything that finds itself within its confines, the 
Gaza Strip is not unreminiscent of a zone – this 
essential territorial tool for the assemblage of trans-
national logistical networks.21 While the zone and 
the camp are both common notions in architec-
tural and urban theory today, they also tend to be 
approached as polar opposites and, as such, to be 
treated in separate literatures. Arguably though, the 
zone and the camp form each other’s mirror image 
and, together, constitute the spatial product of the 
rule of logistics.
The zone is generally defined as a territorial entity 
hosted by a state while enjoying a special status in 
relation to the order of sovereignty normally appli-
cable over that state’s territory. Its particularity thus 
lies in its liminal condition, neither fully within, nor 
completely outside of the state. The plasticity of 
this legal and territorial status lends itself to a wide 
range of adjustments and exemptions from the 
constraints of the nation-state – particularly with 
regard to tax and labour laws – which makes the 
a decisive event – victory or defeat – which would 
open up a new condition of politics. Today, the 
deployment of logistics as a mode of power in its 
own right consists in using all means necessary, 
including war, to organise an essentially defensive 
strategy: preventing a defeat, maintaining an advan-
tageous status quo, keeping an inviable system 
running for as long as possible and against all odds. 
The blockade of Gaza crystallises this strategy.
The Gaza Strip under blockade points to an 
inversion of the classical relation between war and 
logistics – whereby war is turned into an instrument 
to support the durable enforcement of logistics as a 
mode of power. The purpose of the Gaza blockade 
is not to cut all ties with a political and territorial 
entity that has been declared ‘hostile’, but rather to 
establish a particular kind of control over it, based 
on the monitoring and regulation of all the flows that 
traverse it. In a movement that mirrors that of the 
Israeli Disengagement, the locus of power under 
the blockade shifts from the centre of the territory 
to its borders. It is indeed at the border –  or rather, 
within a thick bordering apparatus – that the tech-
nical infrastructure necessary to the enforcement 
of the rule of logistics is situated. The key result of 
such logistical operations is a territorial differential, 
produced and maintained through the orchestra-
tion of a particular regime of mobility between an 
inside and an outside. But one may ask: which one 
is which? [Fig.  2]
The zone in reverse
Sprung out of the ruins of Mandatory Palestine, the 
Gaza strip is an accidental territorial entity –  its 
geographical contours corresponding to an 
entrenching of the frontline of the Arab-Israeli war at 
the time of the 1949 cease-fire. As such, the Gaza 
Strip was born as a vast refugee camp and, in many 
respects, still is to this day. Throughout the period 
of its administration by Egypt, from 1949, and ever 
since its occupation by Israel, from 1967 onwards, 
the borders of Gaza have remained militarised. 
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As a result of the blockade, the internal economy of 
the Gaza Strip has collapsed; starting with food, the 
fulfilment of the most basic needs of the Gaza popu-
lation is largely dependent on external inputs and 
foreign resources, delivered through the complex 
circuits of humanitarian logistics. For this reason, 
the blockade is to be understood as a logistical 
operation not only in terms of the circulations that 
it obstructs but also because of the ones that it sets 
in motion.
Now an established theoretical tradition, the 
understanding of the camp as the paradigmatic 
space of exception tends to focus on an absence.27 
By delimiting a space where the law is suspended, 
the camp would strip its prisoner subjects from 
their former rights and reduce them to a condi-
tion of ‘bare life’.28 Such focus on what is missing 
from a postulated normal picture tends to prevent 
one from seeing and describing what has actually 
emerged within the juridical void created by the 
state of exception, what new technologies have 
been deployed in place of a ‘juridico-discursive’ 
model of power.29 Studies of contemporary camps 
and other ‘states of emergency’ point, in contrast, to 
the fundamentally logistical rationality mobilized by 
humanitarian governance, which tends to ‘neutralize 
political choices by reducing them to simple opera-
tional measures’.30 In order to maintain the regime 
of suspended immobility that it is designed to estab-
lish, the camp relies on logistics. One of the defining 
aspects of the camp is therefore its dynamic relation 
to an outside, by which the mobility that it prevents 
is coextensive of the one that it demands. In this 
perspective, the camp constitutes a paradigmatic 
logistical site as much as the zone does.
A diagram emerges: the zone carves out a 
territory from the normal sovereign rules with the 
primary aim of releasing worthy and valuable flows 
across its borders – those borders being controlled 
from within and tasked with preventing any infil-
tration; while the camp, also resulting from a local 
zone an especially attractive base for transnational 
economic activities. With historical origins in the 
free ports of the Hanseatic league, the zone has 
turned into a crucial tool for the development and 
interconnection of global logistical networks. As 
an easily reproducible template, it functions as a 
spatial lubricant to the flow of goods, labour, and 
capital around the world, by creating a compact 
space where barriers to such highly valued flows 
can be radically lowered. Yet, in order to operate as 
a ‘frictionless realm of exemption’, the zone must be 
established as an enclosure, its spatial boundaries 
clearly delimited and, in most cases, materialised 
by an actual fence.22 In apparent contrast with the 
narrative of freedom and openness that sustains its 
worldwide proliferation, ‘the zone is often a place of 
secrets, hyper-control, and segregation’.23
When the zone is approached as the territo-
rial paradigm of logistics – as the ultimate ‘space 
of flow’ – its material functioning as a closed and 
off-limit space tends to remain under-examined.24 
Conversely, as long as the camp remains predomi-
nantly framed as a singular exception, approached 
in static terms, with a focus on the regime of immo-
bility to which it suspends those whom it encloses, 
what remains obscured is the essential, dynamic 
dimension of camps – by which ‘a floating popu-
lation [is] linked to the satisfaction of logistical 
demands’.25
About two thirds of the people living in Gaza 
are food insecure today. The UN Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA)
currently provides food assistance to more than 
996,000 Palestinian refugees in Gaza, who do not 
have the financial means to cover their basic food 
needs… A further 245,000 food-insecure non-refu-
gees, all falling below the deep poverty line, are 
targeted by [the World Food Programme] with food 
and cash-based transfers.26
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Fig. 1a: APM Maasvlakte II Terminal entrance, Rotterdam, February 2018. Photo: author.
Fig. 1b: Kerem Shalom Terminal entrance, Gaza/Israel, September 2016. Photo: author.
Fig. 1a
Fig. 1b
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quite naturally to safeguarding the operations of 
the latter.35 Yet one project in particular, sited in 
Gaza specifically, does far more than illustrating 
the reversible character of the zone and the camp; 
it actually leverages this reversibility as its core 
strategy of growth. Started in the aftermath of the 
2014 war, ‘Global Palestine, Connected Gaza’ is a 
‘Palestinian private sector initiative that envisages 
Gaza as a globally relevant, knowledge based and 
resource efficient economy pursuing opportunities 
in high value-added services and niche manufac-
turing, trade and transportation’.36 In other words, 
it is a project to turn Gaza into a zone. Unlike most 
of the NGOs and activist voices on the situation in 
Gaza, the project doesn’t simply demand the lifting 
of the blockade, the re-opening of the Strip, and its 
territorial reconnection to the West Bank; rather, it 
sets out to repurpose the infrastructure of enclosure 
originally built to isolate Gaza, so as to create a 
region-sized, ultra-compact, smart gateway to the 
Mediterranean that would serve both Palestine and 
Israel. Instead of flattening the territorial differen-
tial that the blockade has generated, the project is 
about exploiting it by reversing it, thereby turning it 
into an asset for Gaza and for the wider region.
Needless to say, ‘Global Palestine, Connected 
Gaza’ is a highly speculative project. Considering 
the level of precariousness and instability in which 
Gaza finds itself today, with fifty-three percent of 
its population living in poverty, an average of four 
hours of electricity per day, a rate of environmental 
degradation that led the UN to declare it unliveable 
by 2020, and the permanent threat of another attack 
by the Israeli military, the very act of designing a 
detailed vision for a connected Gaza reaching as 
far as the year 2050 may, at first sight, seem rather 
foolish.37 Yet after taking a closer look, one might 
read this approach as an attempt to reckon with the 
particular conditions of logistical power that have 
come to define the reality of the Gaza Strip for many 
years already.
withdrawal of the normal order of sovereignty, has 
the function of containing the circulation of entities 
considered unworthy or dangerous – its borders, 
this time, being controlled from without and tasked 
with impeding any exfiltration. Thinking through the 
symmetry of the zone and the camp, positing them 
as the products of the same logistical rationality, 
opens up a specific understanding of logistics. At a 
macro level, the logistical mandate of optimising the 
mobility of people and things is achieved as much 
through the fostering of valued flows as through the 
hindering of unworthy ones. All the while at a micro 
level, the operations producing an overall hindrance 
of mobility for primary logistical targets requires 
that a whole set of secondary circulations be acti-
vated; and conversely, the smooth flow of ‘globally 
bound stuff’ is always a function of strict measures 
of restraint and containment.31
Of course, the model conditions of a diagram 
never match the complexity of its particular actu-
alisations. By positing the zone and the camp as 
two abstract spatial conditions that jointly manifest 
the implementation of a single mode of power, the 
abovementioned diagram underlines the essentially 
differential order of mobility that logistics orches-
trates. Yet, in practice, the zone and the camp are 
neither opposite nor mutually exclusive conditions. 
Many special economic zones also function as 
actual labour camps for their migrant workforce;32 
and conversely, the advanced logistics that Gaza 
and other humanitarian sites depend upon repro-
duce a number of the characteristic functionalities 
of the zone.33 In fact, once approached through 
the perspective of logistics, the zone and the 
camp reveal their essentially reversible character, 
‘gathering an interior at one moment and guarding 
against an exteriority in the next’.34
There are a number of cases of former military 
bases and detention camps around the world that 
have been turned into key logistical hubs –  the 
security architecture of the former lending itself 
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principles driving the secure and efficient manage-
ment of such a network is a logic of centralisation of 
operational functions: as a result, circulatory flows 
that are omnidirectional and global in scope tend 
to be routed through evermore centralised nodes. 
Counterintuitively perhaps, the expansion of the 
reach of logistics as a mode of power is a function of 
the contraction of its nodes. In a fractal manner, that 
same process of contraction is central to the border 
architecture of both zones and camps, as well as, 
more broadly, to the architecture of logistics around 
the world. [Fig.  3]
Terminal Architecture
There are only two crossings that remain partially 
open along the Gaza border: at its northern tip, the 
Erez terminal – for pedestrians; at its southern end, 
the Kerem Shalom one – for all kinds of goods. With 
the establishment of the blockade, every cross-
border circulation has been re-routed to Gaza’s 
territorial extremities – located forty-five kilometres 
from each other – according to a binary human/
non-human segregation. In total, two crossings to 
handle the needs of a population of two million: 
the Gaza terminals can only be described as engi-
neered choke points.
The process of channelling all circulations through 
a minimal number of terminals, as witnessed in 
Gaza, mirrors a general tendency that is observable 
all over the world: from ships to seaports to cargo 
hubs, warehouses or (e-)distribution centres, the 
architecture of logistics is getting not only bigger, 
but also more polarised.39 Contrary to much of the 
theoretical discourse from the early years of globali-
sation, which prophesied a demise of both location 
and distance as relevant variables in the ‘space of 
flows’ that was allegedly emerging, the logistical 
rationality made them ever more relevant.40 With the 
rise of total cost analysis – a principle at the heart 
of contemporary logistics – every mile of transport, 
every square inch of warehousing, every minute of 
delay along an ever more tensed supply chain were 
The initiative starts, it seems, from the acknowl-
edgement of an impasse: that of leaving the 
resolution of Gaza’s permanent crisis to the formally 
recognised political authorities in charge of it. 
Funded by a consortium of Palestinian enterprises 
in the fields of construction, telecommunication, 
finance, or real estate, the project negotiates its way 
forward by establishing links and gaining supporters 
across a wide range of agencies, think tanks, and 
NGOs, both locally and internationally. The vision 
itself was developed in partnership with AECOM, 
one of the biggest engineering firms in the world, 
which specialises in the development of large infra-
structure projects. And it is only retroactively that 
the project sought, and obtained, an endorsement 
by a governmental institution – in this case, by the 
Palestinian ministry of local government, based 
in Ramallah.38 As such, not only does the project 
articulate, through the vision it proposes, a specifi-
cally logistical model of empowerment for Gaza; but 
also, the strategy that it deploys to reach this objec-
tive already seems to follow, in many ways, the very 
channels by which logistics turns into power. At 
times leveraging, at others by-passing established 
governmental authorities, the power of logistics is 
fundamentally distributed, hinging on the disposi-
tion of its heterogeneous components. Besides, 
as a mode of power, it is often more effective when 
it is not immediately recognised as such – a point 
that seems to underpin the relatively inconspicuous 
project of flipping the Gaza blockade on its head 
and turning it into a thriving zone.
As a territorial interface designed to channel valu-
able flows in an efficient and controlled manner, the 
zone works by offering a single, compact spatial 
solution to an array of logistical demands. The camp 
works in the same way, but with the reverse objec-
tive: an equally efficient spatial solution to manage 
undesirable flows and enforce a particular regime 
of (im)mobility. Products of the same logistical 
rationality, both the zone and the camp form a node 
within a wider network of circulation. Among the 
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the Israeli authorities announced an ‘easing’ of 
the blockade in June of the same year. As part of 
it, the logistical capacity of Kerem Shalom was 
upgraded to 350 truckloads per day. Nevertheless, 
between June 2010 and December 2014, the actual 
average number of truckloads that entered Gaza 
daily was under 150.43 After the thorough destruc-
tion of Gaza’s built environment during the 2014 
Operation Protective Edge, and the entry into force 
of the GRM, the number of truckloads admitted into 
Gaza –  a large proportion of them carrying only 
construction materials to rebuild it –  increased 
sharply to new average of 300 daily over the 
past three years; while again, a new upgrade of 
the Kerem Shalom terminal  – funded by the 
European Union –  has brought its actual capacity 
to 500 truckloads per day. Drawing upon its well-
known technical expertise in the field of logistics, 
the Netherlands donated two high-tech container 
scanners to be installed at Kerem Shalom, so as to 
expedite security checks and facilitate cross-border 
trade flows at large.44 Following much negotiation 
about how Israel would use them, the scanners 
entered into operation in 2015, yet again not at 
full capacity. While the scanners could technically 
handle truckloads up to two metres high, COGAT 
imposes that the total height of goods stacked on 
trucks for commercial shipments out of Gaza does 
not exceed 1.2 metres – increased to 1.5 metres in 
February 2016, for agricultural products only.45
From this brief dip into the mind-bending calcu-
lations by which the blockade is permanently 
recalibrated, the key figure to retain is the ratio 
between logistical capacity and effective throughput. 
Although highly specific to the context of the Gaza 
blockade, the way in which the Israeli authorities 
run the Kerem Shalom terminal can be read as a 
by-the-book implementation of the latest operational 
principle in global logistical management – namely, 
elasticity. Put simply, ‘elastic logistics refers to the 
flexibility to expand and shrink capabilities to align 
with the demands within the supply chain during 
captured into a complex matrix of permanent calcu-
lation. The joint optimisation of the profitability and 
security of supply chains tends to translate itself, 
in spatial terms, into a process of aggregation of 
logistical operations: in the same area, under the 
same roof, behind the same fence. Operative at all 
scales, such a process of optimisation gives rise to 
the zone just like it leads to the terminal.
The Gaza blockade is a special kind of logis-
tical operation, whereby the main target of the total 
cost calculus to be optimised is the minimisation of 
undesired mobility. At its core remains a principle 
of optimisation, with comparable spatial conse-
quences to more common supply chain problems; 
yet the particularity of its strategic objective leads to 
unique operational conditions, as manifested by the 
Gaza terminals.
Permanently closed in 2007, the Karni crossing is 
nearly five times the size of the Kerem Shalom one 
and used to operate at an average capacity of 700 
trucks daily.41 Its location in close proximity to Gaza 
city, the urban core of the Strip, would make it an 
obvious choice to minimise the cost of goods trans-
portation into and out of Gaza. Just as obviously, in 
a logic of economic warfare where such costs are 
primarily borne by the enemy, Karni was among 
the first casualties of the blockade. With all truck 
traffic forcibly re-routed through the much narrower 
Kerem Shalom terminal, between 2007 and 2010 
the average number of truckloads entering Gaza 
daily fell to 80; for the Israeli authorities on the other 
end, it is easy to imagine how the cost of thoroughly 
controlling every truck delivering goods to Gaza 
plummeted, once they could manage it all from a 
single and compact terminal.42 Importantly though, 
the estimated capacity of the Kerem Shalom 
terminal before 2010 was around 150 truckloads 
daily – which indicates that it was operated at just 
above half of its actual capacity. Due to mounting 
local and international pressure, in particular after 
the Mavi Marmara flotilla incident in May 2010, 
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Fig. 2: ‘The Gaza Spatial Vision’ (2016–2050). From ‘Global Palestine, Connected Gaza’ full presentation (2016), 
available at: http://connectedgaza.com.
Fig. 3: View of a 3D reconstruction of the Erez Terminal, based on clandestine photographs by the Active Stills collec-
tive. Part of the Borderground workshop convened by the author (October 2016). Full documentation available at:  
http://borderground.info.
Fig. 2
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scanner, developed by the California-based firm 
L-3 Communications Inc., which appears to be ‘so 
sensitive that it creates a complete holographic 
image of the traveller and allows the screener to see 
even a tissue or penny stuck in a pocket’.50 The very 
high resolution of this screening technology is what 
enables Israel to actually enforce the far-reaching 
restrictions intermittently imposed on Palestinians 
crossing through Erez who, as part of a new direc-
tive announced by COGAT in August 2017, are not 
permitted to carry a USB drive as they exit Gaza.51 
Before reaching the scanner though, any candidate 
to exiting Gaza must walk through a nine hundred 
metre long, four metre wide caged passageway 
spanning the entire no-go zone imposed by Israel 
around Erez. In dazzling contrast with the width of 
the complex, this narrow and elongated excres-
cence is the clearest architectural manifestation 
of the revision of the terminal’s programme: from 
maximising the secure flow of people, to securing 
their minimal flow.
As the respective cases of Kerem Shalom 
and Erez illustrate, the routing of all circulations 
through a single terminal and the concentration 
of all transit procedures within the same architec-
tural complex gives extraordinary leverage to the 
agency operating it. Due to its spatial and functional 
compactness, the terminal works as a key multiplier 
of logistical power – both in terms of its scalar reach 
and its distributed intensity. The tiniest tweak to the 
protocols of circulation across the terminal – of a 
few centimetres here, a few pixels there – immedi-
ately has exponential repercussions throughout the 
circuits that it connects. The architecture of logis-
tics tends towards the terminal as both its formal 
paradigm and its political ideal: the optimal point of 
centralised control over the exchange between two 
or more circuits.
Conclusion
Over the time of the writing of this essay, in Gaza, 
3,778 unarmed protesters were shot with live 
a given timeframe’.46 In order to be able to quickly 
adapt to fluctuations in operational conditions –  be 
they of economic or political order – elastic logis-
tics recommends that every node of the logistical 
network be run at a throughput rate that leaves a 
substantial margin on both sides of the capacity 
spectrum. The optimised terminal, therefore, is not 
the terminal where the gap between capacity and 
throughput is closed, but rather, one in which any 
minor operational adjustment can quickly scale up 
and see its effects propagated on both sides of the 
circuits that it governs.
The Erez terminal, on the other end, pushes the 
elasticity principle to an extreme. In the summer of 
2000, more than twenty-six thousand Palestinian 
workers entered Israel every day through the Erez 
crossing which, in architectural terms, was a simple 
checkpoint. With the outbreak of the second Intifada 
in September 2000, the number of crossings 
decreased sharply as the crossing was frequently 
closed.47 As part of the 2005 disengagement plan, 
Erez was declared an international border terminal 
requiring, as such, a considerable upgrade of its 
security architecture. Completed in February 2007 
at a cost of about thirty-five million dollars, the new 
Erez terminal is a vast, partly glass-walled complex 
that wouldn’t look odd in an international airport. 
While its technical specifications make it capable of 
managing the crossing of forty-five thousand people 
daily, the entry into force of the blockade just four 
months after its completion meant that it never oper-
ated at more than one percent of its total capacity.48 
While substantial fluctuations have occurred from 
one month to another, the average number of daily 
exits of Palestinians through Erez between 2007 
and 2017 was just 190.49
With such a wide margin of manoeuvre between 
capacity and actual throughput, the Israeli authori-
ties are able to make full use of Erez’s cutting-edge 
security technology. The terminal is equipped 
with a state-of-the-art ‘millimetre wave’ body 
49
of logistical power, in as much as it forms the most 
compact spatial solution to the demand of central-
ised control over distributed circulations. The links 
that were traced between the architecture of the 
Gaza blockade and that of more common logistical 
sites enabled us to posit that logistics, as a single 
spatial and technical apparatus, has in fact two 
modes of functioning with regard to the circulations 
that it governs: release and constraint. The defining 
character of logistical power may be located in this 
ambivalence, in its capacity to do both, alternately 
as well as simultaneously, and above all, differ-
entially. At its core, what this essay attempted to 
outline is a notion of logistical power as a mode of 
power exerted through the production of a differen-
tial regime of mobility.
Developing an understanding of logistics as a 
differential technology may enable us to connect, 
both conceptually and practically, the forms of 
resistance to an overpowering circulation of capital 
with the many concurrent struggles over the denial 
of mobility.
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